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ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE PREJUDICIALLY GRUESOME
PHOTOGRAPHS OVER THE OBJECTION OF MR. BETHA
A. THE PHOTOGRAPHS FAILED TO MEET THE THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENT OF ESSENTIALITY
B. THE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN
PROBATIVE
[No Reply - Opening Brief & Oral Argument Sufficient]

II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED TESTIMONY
OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY

In answering Appellant's Opening Brief, the State
mischaracterizes the argument of Mr. Betha, misperceives the
record and misapprehends the law.

Perhaps, most egregious

of those errors is the State's assertion that somehow Mr.
Betha had either opened the door for the Court to permit
evidence of his prior conviction to be admitted into
evidence and/or that counsel for Mr. Betha somehow had
invited the Court to rule as she had and to commit the
error.

(See Brief of Respondent at pages 37 and 38). The

State errs in both assertions.
This Court must recognize that when new defense counsel

1

Mr. Youngberg entered his appearance to defend Mr. Betha
subsequent to the mistrial, the trial court had already
ruled suppressing evidence of the theft conviction but
allowing evidence of the rape conviction to be introduced.
(R. 405-06).

That ruling is contained in Appellant's

Opening Brief at Addendum A.

Despite that fact, Mr.

Youngberg, on behalf of Mr. Betha, filed a motion in limine
renewing the issue and asking to exclude all prior
conviction evidence.

He urged the Court to keep out all

prior conviction evidence acknowledging his awareness of the
Court's earlier order.

(R. 427-28).

Later, after hearing substantial testimony in the
matter, but before Mr. Betha testified, the court conducted
an in-chambers off the record discussion.

The record

subsequent to that in-chambers discussion reveals that the
court indicated on the record her decision to further narrow
her order in reference to the admission of the rape
conviction.(R. 1386-96).
Addendum B.

See Opening Brief of Appellant at

That record demonstrates that during the in-

chambers discussion counsel for Mr. Betha requested that the
nature of the conviction should not be introduced and urged,
perhaps, a minimum position that if the prior is introduced
2

as ordered by the court to that point that at least the
substance or nature of that conviction could not be
introduced. (R. 1386-1396).
The court should not have allowed evidence of the prior
rape conviction of Mr. Betha to be introduced under an
appropriate analysis of Rule 609 and Rule 404.

The fact

counsel requested and persuaded the court to reconsider a
relaxed position from her earlier ruling can in no way be
considered as an invitation on the part of Mr. Betha to
"invite" or "trick" the court into making an erroneous
decision.

The court had made its erroneous decision in the

first place and counsel, in urging her to correct that
decision, was able to persuade the court for a middle-ofthe-road position.

That position was not the position

requested initially or desired by Mr. Youngberg on behalf of
Mr. Betha.

To the extent the court's on-the-record

discussion referencing the in-chambers discussion indicates
that Mr. Youngberg requested that medium approach does not
relieve the Court of its obligation to conduct a fair trial
and to appropriately rule on the initial evidentiary issue,
which to that point the court had not done.
The State mis-cites Utah law in support of its claim of
3

invited error.

At Brief of Respondent, page 40, the State

relies on State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), while
providing the citation for State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201
(Utah 1993).
question.

State v. Dunn is most instructive on this

Like our case, Dunn dealt with an issue regarding

prior conviction evidence.

Unlike our case, Dunn dealt with

a trial court reversing itself during trial from its earlier
pretrial ruling based on erroneous reliance on bad law cited
by the defendant.

Dunn had relied on the ruling he had

erroneously received from the court and testified, only then
to have the issue re-opened and his testimony impeached by
the prior conviction. 1

The Court stated the following:

1

Dunn claimed that the trial court committed reversible
error in allowing the prosecution to question him about his prior
conviction. Before trial, Dunn moved to suppress evidence of a
California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. The trial
judge held a hearing on the motion and ruled from the bench. Dunn
contends that the judge ruled that the prosecution could not
adduce evidence of Dunn's prior conviction so long as Dunn did
not introduce evidence of his own character. The State, on the
other hand, contends that the judge barred the evidence of the
prior conviction only from the prosecution's case-in-chief.
The case went to trial without clarification of the ruling.
During the defense's case-in-chief, several witnesses testified
before Dunn took the stand. No character evidence was adduced.
After Dunn finished testifying, the prosecutor asked that the
judge allow the state to impeach Dunn by cross-examining him
about the prior conviction. Dunn's trial counsel objected,
arguing that the pretrial ruling precluded admission of the
evidence. The judge, relying on statutory and case law authority
that he apparently was not aware of at the time of the pretrial
ruling, overruled the defense counsel's objection and allowed
Dunn to be cross-examined about the prior conviction. Dunn, 850
4

We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot
take advantage of an error committed at trial when
that party led the trial court into committing the
error. This rule, which is known as the "invited
error" doctrine, has two principal purposes. First, it
fortifies our long-established policy that the trial
court should have the first opportunity to address the
claim of error. Second, it discourages parties from
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.
In the instant case, Dunn's trial counsel moved to
exclude the evidence of his prior conviction and
apparently provided the trial court with citations to
the authority on which the court based its pretrial
ruling. However, contrary to Dunn's position before
the trial judge, the law at the time clearly allowed
evidence of prior convictions to be admitted for
impeachment purposes without any restriction. Dunn's
counsel's actions in making the motion in limine
without informing the trial judge of the controlling
law led the trial court into error. Therefore, Dunn is
precluded from asserting that the pretrial ruling
misled him into taking the stand.

Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220-21 (citations omitted; footnote
omitted).

Contrary to the facts in Dunn, what occurred with

Mr. Betha did not violate the "invited error" doctrine and
its two principal purposes.

Mr. Betha (1) did provide the

court in the first instance with the opportunity to address
the potential error, and (2) he asserted his claim of error,
and still so insists, from the denial of his initial motion
in limine to exclude all prior conviction evidence and

P.2d at 1220-21 (footnote omitted).
5

claims no relief, or at the very least insufficient relief,
from the reconsidered ruling of the court.

Mr. Betha's

renewed request to the court was not intentionally
misleading to preserve a hidden ground to reverse, but
rather was a position recognizing that conviction evidence
is coming in and a limit should be placed on the information
reaching the jury.

No invited error occurred; only error

occurred as contained within the argument.

The court, not

defense counsel is responsible for the error.
The State next contends that since Mr. Betha only
challenges the absence of Rule 609 analysis and not the
application of the rule that it will not address the issue.
Brief of Respondent at 40.

Mr. Betha insists that the

trial court failed to conduct an analysis of the State v.
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), five factors or, as the
State prefers, to apply those factors to the facts in the
Betha case.

Mr. Betha provides in his opening brief the

necessary application of the facts in the case to the
factors outlined in Banner.

Brief of Appellant at 34-37.

The trial court's recitation of key words in its original
order (R. 405-06) is inadequate and incorrect as a matter of
law.
6

Finally, the State urges the Court that, even if
the trial court improperly admitted the evidence of the
prior conviction, that error was harmless.

The State

believes that a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result could not have occurred for Mr. Betha, see Brief of
Respondent at page 41.

The State errs in so urging.

As

noted in Appellant's Opening Brief, admission of prior
conviction evidence is presumed prejudicial.
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

State v.

Our Utah Supreme

Court has recognized that permitting the jury to speculate
as to this type of evidence prejudices the defendant and his
constitutional right to a fair trial.

The Court stated:

The basis of these limitations on the admissibility of
evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact
finder to convict the accused because of bad character
rather than because he is shown to be guilty of the
offenses charged. Because of this tendency, such
evidence is presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason
for the admission of the evidence other than to show
criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded.
Id.

More to the point, the violation is constitutional in

nature.

The Saunders' Court examining the impact of other

crimes evidence on a jury, albeit in a slightly different
context of severing charges as opposed to convictions,
reiterated from a long line of cases:
7

More relevant here are our decisions in State v.
McCumber and State v. Gotfrey. In McCumber, we held
that due process was violated by the joinder of five
counts, including aggravated burglary, aggravated
sexual assault, and attempted rape. We noted, "[W]ere
the diverse counts of the information in question to be
tried separately, evidence relating to each count would
not be heard by the jury trying other counts; the
evidence relating to the various alleged offenses is
not 'mutually admissible.'" Similarly, in Gotfrey, we
held the joinder of two rape charges arising from
incidents several months apart and with different
victims improper under our former statute, stating,
[C]are must be taken that the statute is not misused to
deprive an accused of a fair trial upon an offense by
joining different offenses so that evidence concerning
charges unrelated in time and nature, which would
normally not be admissible upon a trial, could be
admitted as to the multiple offenses in an effort to
stigmatize the defendant and thus make it questionable
that the jury would give a fair and dispassionate
consideration to the evidence on the first charge.
Id. at 742 (footnotes omitted; citations omitted)(emphasis
added).
The trial court's error allowing testimony of Mr.
Betha's prior criminal history prejudiced his right to a fir
trial.

His case should be reversed and remanded for a new

trial.

III. THE COMBINATION OF ERRORS PREVENTED THE DEFENDANT
FROM RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL
[No Reply - Opening Brief & Oral Argument Sufficient]
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
SENTENCING MR. BETHA TO SEPARATE SENTENCES FOR BOTH
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
Mr. Betha only comments in reply of the State's answer
to draw attention to the State's concluding paragraph
contained within this point.

See Brief of Respondent at 49.

There the State claims three distinct aggravated assaults
despite only having charged and convicted of one such count.
Three failures exist in this analysis.

First, the

companion charge of Aggravated Burglary as well as the
charges for Aggravated Sexual Assault and Aggravated
Kidnapping each required their own elements in aggravation
to which some of this evidence must have ascribed.
Second, each suggested aggravated assault likewise met
the criteria outlined in the charge of Aggravated Burglary
making State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985),
compellingly on point and not distinguishable as claimed by
the State.

When there are multiple ways of alleging

offenses, you must "consider the evidence to determine
whether that relationship existed between the specific
variations of the crimes actually proved at the defendant's
trial."

Id. at 877.

See Brief of Appellant at 39-42.
9

Finally, the ambiguities of the "could haves" as
postulated by the State reinforce that uncertainty exists as
to the route the jury may have taken to render the
convictions.

Accordingly, this offense is mere surplusage

as indicated by the Court in State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97
(Utah 1983).

CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Betha
respectfully requests that his convictions be reversed and a
L/[

new trial ordered.

Jo

RESPECTFULLY submitted this jf) ' day of January, 1998.
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